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Leadenhip and the War between_ the States 
A firestorm swept the United States of America in the 19th century culminating in a 
bloody war which engulfed the nation. The causes of the War between the St.ates have been 
debated since the fighting ceased, yet most historians agree that there are three major issues 
which the war was fought over. These include: state versus federal rights to govern, slavery, and 
sectionalism. The spark which instigated the conflict occurred in the presidential election of 
1860 in which the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, defeated a trio of Democratic 
challengers. Within weeks, much of the lower South had seceded from the Union with the 
Upper South following suit with President Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers after the onset of 
hostilities at Fort Sumter, South Carolina on April 12, 1861.1 Any hopes of a peaceful solution 
to the conflict disappeared after this date, and the need for leadership skyrocketed as each side 
clamored to fill leadership positions in the military while beginning to train others to fill the 
void. 
At the outset of hostility in 1861, the United States Anny stood at t 6,367 officers and 
men.2 Although such a small number of trained soldiers stood ready to forcibly reunite the 
eleven states comprising the Confederate States of America to the Union, few recognized what a 
difficult and long war it would be. Many in the North viewed the situation as a rebellion which 
would be quelled in three months time. The Unionists recognized their relative strength when 
1 William C. Davis, Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the 
Civil War, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 4. 
Ernest and Trevor Dupuy, The Conu,a.ct History of the Civil War. (New York: 
Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1960), 27. 
compared with that of the secessionists because of their manufacturing strength and enonnous 
population size .
... The population of the eleven seceding stares consisted of5,500,000 whites and 
3,500,000 Negro slaves. There were 22,000,000 inhabitants in the twenty-two 
Northern states ... The ratio of available combat manpower was about five to two 
in favor of the North. The North, in both manufacture and agriculture was an 
economic entity capable of supporting a protracted war .... 
This indicates that the Union could muster a larger military force than the Confederacy. It was 
extremely rare for the armies to be of equal size during any battle, often the Northern anny 
would have a huge statistical advantage. Plus, the huge manufacturing advantage in the North 
seemed to spell doom for the South ftom the beginning. "The North, with its vast manufacturing 
and agricultural resources, would have little trouble in supplying clothing, equipment and food 
to its anned forces ... The major supply source of the Confederate annies ... woo.Id be by capture 
from the Union armies. '' 4 These disadvantages were damaging to the Southern armies, but were 
not the ultimate reason for the demise of the Confederacy. Leadership was the primary reason 
that the North won the war, and it was the reason that the armies of the Confederacy were able to 
successfully defend their nation during the four years of war and with the disadvantages they 
faced. 
The importance of the major generals to the war effort on each side is immeasurable, and 
no one disputes the vital role which their leadership played in the outcome of the Civil War. This 
paper wi 11 explore the leadership of the three major generals in command of the primary armies 
of the Confederacy and Union. The leadership of Confederate General Robert E. Lee, and 
3 Dupuy,29. 
4 Dupuy, 30. 
Union Generals George B. McClell~ and Ulysses S. Grant played a major part in determining 
the course of the war. This paper will explore the concepts of servant and charismatic 
leadership, and there applicability to Civil War leaders designated by this study. lt will also 
view the various powers of influence used by these leaders to achieve their established goals. 
One of the more fascinating topics of inquiry is that of followership. This paper hopes to 
analyze the success in which these leaders served as followers., and to see how they supported 
and raised up their own followers. There are also three leadership issues which shall be 
examined and provide further insight in the leadership of not only the men listed above, but of 
countless others who fought and died for what they believed in. The development of new 
leaders is an important issue which will help in the examination of the leadership evident at this 
time. 
I. Servant Leadership 
The concept of a Servant Leader is fascinating because it seems to be an oxymoron. 
How can one be a servant if tbey are to lead? This seems even stranger when placed in the 
context of military leaders. Robert Greenleaf argued that "The servant-leader is servant first .. .It 
begins with tbe natural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. ·Then conscious choice 
brings one to aspire to lead."' Individuals such as Jesus Christ, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin 
Lutber King Jr. immediately seem to fit the definition for seivant leaders. Each individual 
involved with the military serve their respective commanders, government, and country. This 
5 Robert K. Greenleaf: "Servant Leadership," J. Thomas Wren, e<L The Leader's 
C12mmuig11; losj ghts OD, Leadershi12 Ib.muah lbi; Ages. (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 22. 
3 
does not make every military leader a servant leader. Rather, it is the reasoning behind their 
actions which demonstrate the qualities of a servant leader. 
With the secession of the lower South from the Unio~ Colonel Robert E. Lee was placed 
in a difficult position. Colonel Lee)s reputation had been made during tbe war with Mexico and 
he was summoned to Washington D.C. on April 18, 1861 even as the Virginia legislature began 
meeting to discuss secession. Lee was offered command of the enormous federal army which 
would be used to quiet the rebellion in the South. The offer was rejected, and the next day 
Virginia's secession was official. Lee resigned his commission rather than take up anns against 
his state and the South on April 20, 1861.6 In his resignation letter from Federal service to 
General Winfield Scott, Robert E. Lee wrote that "l shall carry with me to the grave the most 
grateful recollections of your kind consideration, and your name and fame will always be dear to 
me. Save in the defense of my native State, I never desire to draw my sword. "7 Lee was tom 
between the North and South, but felt a commitment to his home. On April 23, Robert E. Lee 
was offered command ofVirginia~s forces, and demonstrates in his acceptance speech a servant 
mentality: 
.. .I accept the position your partiality has assigned me, though [I] would greatly 
have preferred your choice should have fallen on one more capable. Trusting to 
Almighty God, an approving conscience and the aid of my fellow citizens, I will 
devote myself to the defense and service of my native State, in whose behalf 
alone would I have ever drawn my sword. ... 3 
15 Burke Davis, Gray Fox: Robert E. Lee and the Civil Wat. (New York: Rinehart and 
Company lnc, 1956), 12-14. 
7 [bid, 9 
8 The Wartime Papers ofR,E, Lee, ed. Clifford Dowdey, (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company. 1961 ), 11. 
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Robert E. Lee demonstrates his desire to be servant first by having preferred the position go to 
one more capable than he, but be would be honored to serve the state in whatever capacity 
possible. This continues with bis desire to serve only in defense of his state. It was his wish to 
serve only in defense of his country~ and that willingness to serve allowed him to step forward 
and lead the armies of Virginia, and eventually of the Confederacy. Robert E. Lee could have 
chosen to retire to his plantation in Arlington, Virginia and allowed the war to pass him by, but 
his willingness to serve and protect his state led to Lee's action. Lee wanted to avoid a war, his 
acceptance speech clearly demonstrates his reluctance to fight~ but he desired to serve his 
beloved Virginia and that Jed to the action he took. 
Lee's servant nature towards his followers can sti11 be seen after fighting the war through 
his surrender at Appomattox Courthouse in April of 1865. General Lee needed to serve his 
soldiers, and the best way he could accomplish that was by surrendering the anny and ending 
any future suffering for the men who followed him. Lee wrote in General Order, No 9 to his 
troops, "but feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that would compensate 
for the loss that must have attended the continuance of the contest, I detennined to avoid the 
useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.~'9 There 
was no longer any real hope for victmy~ and even if it could be attained the price was to high. 
Lee demonstrated his continued service to t'he men by surrendering them at Appomattox. 
George B. McClellan was the man the North turned to lead their forces after the rejection 
of General Lee. After a successful campaign to help liberate the territory which would later 
become West Virgini, McClellan entered Washington as a hero. He was soon thereafter 
1 IhG '1llmms; emm i2CR'1.bsa:t JJ is, 934. 
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assigned to the command of Union forces in Virginia and the District of Columbia. In a letter to 
his wife. McClellan wrote: 
.. .I find myself in a new and strange position here-President, Cabinet, Oeneral 
Scott and all deferring to me-by some strange operation of magic I seem to have 
become the power of the land . .l see already the main causes of our recent failure-
I am sure that I can remedy these and that I can lead these annies of men to 
victory .. .I will endeavor to enclose with this the ''thanks of Congress" which 
please preserve. I feel very proud of it General Scott ob_jected to it on the 
ground that it should be accompanied by a gold medal. I cheerfully acquiesce in 
the Thanks by themselves, hoping to win the medal by some other action 10 •••• 
The implicatiom of this letter are quite obvious. He refers to himself$ the power of the land, 
and believes that he is the right choice to lead the Union to victory. This hard1y sounds like what 
one would expect from an individual who wished to serve first. McClellan as this paper will 
explore further in later sections believed that it was his place to lead. not to serve or follow. 
There is very little humbleness in his fetter when compared to that ofLee. Whereas, Lee was 
willing to accept the post offere~ but wished a more deserving candidate would be cho~ 
McClellan indicates that he was worthy of the position and the power which came with it. It can 
be inferred that he was willing to seive for his country, not because they requested it, but 
because he deserved it. 
It seems that McClellan enjoyed the glory and power of his position too much to be a 
servant leader. General McClellan apparently allowed his reputation and ability to go to his 
head. Shortly after his appointment to lead the Union troops. he was at a dinner party with a 
variety of dignitaries. McClellan Mote that he entered the room &'with the old General leaning 
on me-the old veteran (Scott) and his yotmg successor; I could see that many marked the 
10 Ibs ~I !lit 1!111ma gf <Jmac a, MQCs;llan; Ss-1"1"-' ~w;11&;, 1~2:l'll~, 
ed. Stephen W. Searst (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1989), 70. 
contrast."11 This quote indicates that McClellan clearly viewed himself as the man of the hour, 
the leader of the future. The dinner party continued and the :British ambassador referred to 
McClellan as the next president of the United States. 12 With all the praise and adulation that 
McClellan was receiving, it is understandable that his ego was growing, yet from the very 
beginning it did not seem as if he was interested in being a servant leader because he was 
performing a service to his country with the focus being on the benefits which would be received 
for leading. 
McClellan would probably have been repulsed by the idea that he was a servant, but he 
did serve his soldiers. McClellan was always concerned for the well being of his troops. He 
would delay taking military action until he was certain that the risk to his followers would be 
minimal. During the Peninsular campaign, McC1e11an moved slowly and only attacked when 
convinced he outnumbered the Confederates at that particular spot. This slow, deliberate 
approach demonstrates how he served to protect his troops. :However, McClellan did not 
maintain a servant mentality when dealing with his superiors. On June 25, 1862, shortly after 
the battle of second Manassas, McClellan writes that "Jfl save this army now, 1 tell you plainly 
that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington. You have done yom best to 
sacrifice this army."13 McClellan is not viewing his actions as serving his country, rather, he 
understands his job to save the army. The difference between the words serving and saving is 
11 Stephen W. Sears. GeQme B, McClellan; The Yolltll Napoleon. (New York: Ticknor 
and Fields, 1988), 96. 
12 Ibid 96 
' 
13 Mitchell, Iosep~ Military Leaders in the Civil War, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1972), 16. 
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important when exploring the servant attitude ofleaders. To save someone is to rescue them, to 
salvage a situation, which is quite different from being a servant. A leader can save a situation 
while still maintaining a servant mentality and focus, yet McClellan is unwilling to view himself 
as a servant. Rather, he sees himself as a savior. 
On March 9, 1864, Union General Ulysses S. Grant received the commission of 
lieutenant-general thus promoting him to the highest ranking military position in the country as 
he now commanded all of the Federal annies.14 General Grant was promoted to a rank which 
had previously not existed, but unlike McClellan, Grant did not allow the honor to feed his ego, 
he desired only to serve his country to the best ofhis capabilities. With his military successes in 
the Western theater at Forts Henry and Donnelson and the Battle of Shiloh, Grant had fast 
entered the limelight of the American public. It took a concerted effort on the part of the general 
to finally dissipate the talk of his running for President in the election of 1864, because Grant 
believed he could best serve the country while he was in the anny. Grant even discussed turning 
the promotion to Lieutenant--General down because he feared it would trap him in Wash1ngton, 
and he wanted to serve his country and men by being at the forefront of the conflict 15 Grant 
wanted to serve his country, not accept any positions or be seen as a figure head, rather, he 
wanted to do the best job he could to end the war and reunite the union. 
14 Ulysses S. Grant. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. (New York: Charles L. Webster and 
Company. 1894). 404~05. 
1
' Bruce Catton. Grant Tukes Commancl (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968) 
104~110. 
A major difference between Generals Grant and McClellan was the ability of Grant to 
recognize the importance of others. Shortly after receiving news of his promotion, Grant 
dispatched a letter to Generals Sherman and McPherson in which he stated: 
... WhiJst I have been eminently successful in this war in at least gaining the 
confidence of the public, no one feels more than me how much of this success is 
due to the energy, skill, and the hannonious putting forth of that energy and skill, 
of those who it has been my good fortune to have occupying a subordinate 
position under me ... but what 1 want is to express my thanks to you and 
McPherson as the men to whom above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I 
have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of 
assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to 
do entitled you to the reward I am receiving16 ••.• 
General Grant recognized that the reason he had gained public support, and the reward of a 
promotion was due to the effectiveness of his subordinates as followers, and as leaders. In 
essence, Grant was showing thanking his followers for their servant leadership, and by doing this 
he was demonstrating his servanthood to his men. 
The impression of the historian John Lothrop Motley had after meeting Grant probably 
best describes how Grant was a servant leader: "'I cannot get over the impression he made on 
me ... that of entire loss of self-hood in a great aim which made all the common influences which 
stir up other people as nothing to him." 17 The impression that Grant made on people was that 
of an individual who cared more about his country and duty than about himself. Personal 
achievements meant very tittte in comparison to his service to the country. 
II. Charismatic Leade111hip 
16 Ibid, 123. 
17 Ibid, 119. 
There are many diff~nt v1ews artd ~finttions of charismatic teade~ip. All the 
definitions refer to a variety of traits, or actions which a charismatic leader might take. Each of 
these theories and traits can fall into three components of charismatic leadership. These are 
Envisioning. Energizing. and Enabling. If a leader can meet the three components, then it is 
probable that he or she is charismatic. During a war, charisma is often valued in a leader, and 
the three major generals of the American Civil War seemed able to provide the charisma 
desired. 
Envisioning "involves the creation of a picture of the future, or of a desired future state 
with which people can identify and which can generate excitement ... the leader provides a 
vehicle for people to develop commitment, a common goal around which people can rally, and a 
way for people to feel successful."18 Simply having a vision is not enough to be considered a 
charismatic leader. One must also have the ability and the rhetorical skills to cause the 
followers to believe in the attainment of the vision. A Charismatic ]eader wou1d " ... stir 
dissatisfaction with the p~nt while they build support for their picture of a new 
future ... Although the leader's message is important, so is the way it is communicated."19 It is 
this ability to develop and communicate a vision which allows one to reach out and unite 
followers behind the vision. 
18 David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, '"Beyond the Charismatic Leader: Leadership 
and Organizational Change," J. Thomas Wren, ed .. The Leader·s Companion; Insiib,ts on 
Leadership ThroY&b the Ages, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 109. 
19 Richard Hughes, Ginnet, and Curphy, Leadershitr Enhancin~ the Lessons gf 
Experience, (Burr Ridge: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1993). 437. 
Robert E. Lee was a visionary in that he saw a Virginia at peace as a goal to be achieved. 
Lee united his men behind the vision of their homes~ their families, and their state. In order to 
protect and serve these things they must repel the Northern invaders and fight for their freedom. 
His short term visions were for successful campaigns and winning battles in unorthodox 
manners, Lee was a risk taker who had a vision of how the battle should go; and more times than 
nought it went his way. General Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia with 
its backs facing the gates of Richmond in Spring, 1862, with a numerically superior force in his 
front. Instead ofbracing for a siege as most generals would have done in this situation, Lee went 
on the offensive attacking McClellan and forcing him back during the Seven Days Battle. Later 
that summer, shortly after the Confederate victory at Second Manassas, the Southern anny 
launched an offensive into Maryland in the hopes of alleviating Virginia from the pressures of 
war. Lee had the yjsion of gaining support in the border state ofMary1and during the offensive. 
With a solid victory, the Confederacy could hope for the intervention of European countries. 
This vision was shared by all the Southern troops who marched into the North, and they marched 
into Maryland with optimism for the future. Once again outnumbered, Lee chose to split his 
army into two forces and send one to attack Harpers Ferry whlle the other would delay the Union 
force. Although this vision would not be attained as the Anny of Northern Virginia withdrew 
from the North after the battle, the troops sti11 hoped for victory. 
McClellan was also a visionary, although bis vision was often doubted by those around 
him. McClellan's vision was for a war in which h1s brilliance alone would win, and he would 
continue in the public's eye until his death. McClellan disagreed with the tbree prong assault 
planned by General Winfield Scott at the outset of the war. He was in favor of one massive 
anny to serve as a juggernaut against the Southern states. His vision was for an army of273,000 
troops to march South and take each of the major Confederate cities. McCle11an argued that 
with the addition of garrison and reserve forces, he would need direct control over three quarters 
of the 500,000 men that had been authorized to quell the rebellion.20 This vision was never 
officially approved by the Federal government, and McClellan failed to achieve it although he 
continually asked for more troops even as his army exceeded I 00,000 combatants. 
McClellan was quite capable of transferring his vision to the troops. Not the strategy 
above, rather, he was able to cause the men to see themselves as the finest equipped and 
grandest of all armies. He helped mold this vision to his troops through their extensive periods 
of training and their grand reviews. On November 20, 1861, as McC1e11an organized a review of 
65,000 troops with bands playing, and cannons firing in salute. The spectacle was attended by 
more than 30,000 people including President Lincoln, his cabinet and many other dignitaries 
mixed with the commoners who composed the remainder of the crowd.21 Reviews such as this 
did wonders for the Army of the Potomac as they heard the thousands cheering for them and 
read in the papers of how grand and marvelous they were. McClellan did bis best to stroke the 
egos of his troops and make them believe in themselves and their purpose of fighting the 
Confederacy. For all the speeches, reviews, and training, little action was taken which caused 
some wavering of belief in McClellan• s vision amongst the troops and the government. 
McClellan bad spread his vision of a grand anny to his men, and they became eager to act and 
Stephen W. Sears, 98-99. 
Stephen W. Sears, 134. 
end the rebellion. As time passed, many troops, as well as the government, began losing faith in 
McClellan due to the inactivity of the Anny of the Potomac. 
Ulysses S. Grant envisioned a reunited Union. His vision was clear and his methods of 
atta1ning it were equally apparent. General Grant spent little time parading his army, instead, be 
made sure his force was prepared and then marched South and into battle. It was his willingness 
to fight and show a commitment to achieving his vision that endeared men to him. One of the 
way his vision was transferred was in the " ... relentless way Grant reached out to take soldiers 
from the bombproof Washington garrison and add them to the fighting force." He was 
attempting to " ... get every available man into the field as early as possible. "22 Grant took men 
from the defenses of Washington and other garrisons in an effort to strengthen his force, not 
because he feared a larger Confederate force as McClellan ha<L but because he wanted to fight 
and continue to fight the Southern soldiers. The ideal example occurred at the Battle of the 
Wilderness in the Summer of 1864. The Anny of the Potomac fought, and suffered terrible 
losses. Grant's vision was demonstrated to his troops in his commitment to fight the South. 
Rather than retreating as previous generals had, Grant chose to bring the full force of the Union 
army against the Confederates. His refusal to accept defeat, and willingness to face enormous 
losses ifit meant victory, won many of Grant's soldiers to share bis vision. 
The second component of charismatic 1eadership is the ability to energize others behind 
the vision or goal. The energizing component includes such things as seeking, finding and using 
22 Bruce Catto~ 163. 
13 
success. expressing personal confidence and demonstrating excitement. 23 A Charismatic leader 
will "build trust in their leadership and the attainability of their goa1s through seemingly 
unshakable self-confidence, strength of moral conviction, personal example and sacrifice of 
unconventional tactics or behavior." 24 This second component is equally important in 
determining whether or not a leader can be considered charismatic. 
Robert E. Lee replaced the wounded Joseph Johnston, during the Peninsula campaign, on 
June 1, 1862. Lee sent an orderto the soldiers of the Anny of Northern Virginia announcing his 
replacement of General Johnston. Lee wrote of his disappointment over the loss of Johnston and 
that "He hopes his absence will be but temporary. and while he will endeavor to the best of his 
ability to perform his duties. he feels he wfl1 be totally inadequate to the task unless he sha11 
receive the cordial support of every officer and man. "25 General Lee was attempting to gain the 
support of his disheartened troops at the outset, but it was with the first of numerous victories 
over the Seven Days Battle that succeeded in energizing the Confederate soldiers as the Union 
anny was pushed from the gates of Richmond back down the Peninsula. Lee was successful in 
seeking, finding and using success with some unorthodox tactics as the undennanned Army of 
Northern Virginia went on the offensive against the much larger Union force. While success in 
battle won the hearts of the troops, General Lee gained support from hts officers after cath.ng 
them all together shortly after taking over and discussed his plans and listened to their ideas. 
David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, "Beyond the Charismatic Leader: Leadership 
and Organizational Change," J. Thomas Wren, ed., The Leader's Companion: Insights on 
Leadership Through the Ages. (New York: The Free Press, 1995 ), l 09. 
24 Richard Hughes, Ginnett and Curphy, 438. 
2s Ed., Clifford Dowdey, 181. 
This altowed Lee to succeed in energizing his officer corp because "the field officers who were 
to lead the Anny of Northern Virginia felt themselves vital -parts of the growing force; they had 
the feeling that the commander knew their problems and valued their opinions."26 Meetings 
such as this built trust between General Lee and his officers and allowed them to see the 
confidence that he had in them, the common soldiers, and himself. With the belief that their 
commander was committed to victory and was willing to trust them. they became energized for 
the future of the Anny of Northern Virginia. 
There are many examples which demonstrate the success General Lee had in energizing 
his men. In early summer, 1864. the army of Northern Virginia clashed with the Anny of the 
Potomac during the first offensive led by General Grant at the Battle of the Wilderness. The 
Wilderness was an area of thickets, trees, and vines which made vision and coordination nearly 
impossible. It also helped to negate the huge size advantage that the Federa1 force had. On June 
Sth. after a bloody battle, the Confederate force was pushed back, disorganized, with units 
scattered across the battlefield. Many of the soldiers began to withdraw from the field 
anticipating a retreat and the disorientation of the troops made defeat a real possibility. General 
Lee recognized the disarray which threa1ened to destroy his army and moved to organize and 
lead the counterattack himself. ''But the soldiers would have none of it. One of them grabbed 
the horse's bridle, and Jed the fuming general back down the road, while his comrades shouted: 
'General Lee to the rear, General Lee to the rear!~27 The men rallied and moved to attack. The 
presence of Lee and his willingness to risk bis own life energized the troops. Their love for the 
26 Burke Davis, Gray Fox.. (New York: Rinehart & Co. Inc .• 1956), 80. 
27 Dupuy, 292. 
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general and desire to please him led to their reorganiz.ation and counterattack which saved the 
Confederate army from destruction. Their counterattack succeeded in stopping the Federal 
advance, but the Northerners did not retreat as General Grant used his numerical superiority to 
flank the Confederates and force them to retreat. They cared for their leader so much tha1 they 
refused to enter battle with him at the front because of the likelihood be would be killed 
Another example occurred at the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at 
Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, t 865. As Lee returned to his anny after surrendering to 
Grant, the gloom, disappointment, and despair that hung over the air was lifted as he 
approached One of Lee's soldiers, Charles Blackford described the scene . 
... When they saw the we11-known figure of General Lee approaching, there was a 
general rush from each side of the road to greet him as he passed, and two solid 
wans of men were formed along the whole distance. As soon as he entered his 
avenue of these old soldiers, the flower of the anny, the men who had stood to 
their duty through thick and thin in so many battles, wild, heartfelt cheers arose 
which so touched General Lee that tears filled his eyes and trickled down his 
cheeks as he .rode his splendid charger, hat in hand, bowing his 
acknowledgments. Many expressions of confidence and affection were 
given ... One man, I remember, extended his arms, and with an emphatic gesture, 
said, "I love you just as well as ever. General Lee!"28 
The valiant men who comprised the Army of Northern Virginia had just lost the war which they 
had fought so dearly for. Yet, the presence of General Lee energized and brought them to 
cheers. 
General McClellan also saw the importance in energizing his troops. The personal 
confidence that McClellan had can be seen in his return to command the Army of the Potomac 
28 Blackford, Charles, Memoirs of Life In and Out of the An;ny in Yifiinia Purin1t the 
War Between the States. Ed. Susan Blackford, (Lynchburg, VA: J.P. BeH Company, Book, Job 
and Commercial Printers, 1896), Appendix V. 
for the second time. McClellan upon hearing of his commission wrote his wife that ~Again I 
have been called upon to save the country."29 McClellan never lacked self•confidence. and that 
was something which was contagious among the-troops. One ofMcCleUan)s strengths was in 
his ability to build trust among his soldiers. Between the building of confidence of his troops 
with the grand marches and parades, McClellan himsetf••heHeved morale was related directly to 
the confidence officers and men felt in the general commanding: if they believed in him they 
would believe in the tasks he set for them."'.)() How did the man who would become known as 
''Little Macl' accomplish this? McClellan would ·•often stop to chat casually with a squad or 
company. He might ask the men if they were lready for a brush, with the Rebels, and when they 
shouted that they were, he promised to risk it with them. ••11 It was this ability to energize his 
troops by building trust and showing self--confidence which helped McClellan achieve some 
charisma. However~ as time passed his men were itching ior a battle~ yet they were still 
endeared McClellan f'or the good care he provided them. 
Ulysses S. Grant had self..con:fidence in his plan to defeat the Soutb because of his 
recognition of tbe disparity between the two sides in regards to manpower, and economics. By 
talcing the war to the South he was guaranteed eventua1 success if nothing else than for the 
attrition which would occur in the Southern army. He sought out and found success on the 
battlefiel~ and it served to provide him with the best way of building trust and energizing 
soldiers. When Grant took command of the Army of the Potomac, he had the reputation of a 
29 Ed., Stephen Sears, 435. 
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winner from his exploits in the Western theater where he earned the nickname of"Unconditional 
Surrender" Grant for forcing rebe1s to surrender unconditional1y at Fort Henry and Donelson. 
He took the anny, and demonstrated that they were going to be used and they were going to fight 
the battles necessary to win the war. During the campaign for Richmond, numerous battles were 
fought with dreadful losses for the federal forces, yet "the army remained capable of rapid 
movement, and its morale seemed to be as high as ever because when all was said and done the 
soldiers felt that they had made genuine progress in a month of campaigning. "32 Although the 
anny was losing enormous numbers, the men were stilJ confident because they had been winning 
engagements with the Army of Northern Virginia and were marching towards victory. As one 
Umon soldier said. "Grant does not know how to retreat ... confidence is unbounded in him."33 
This confidence and desire to win was contagious among the troops and helped energize them 
for continued bloody battle. He provided the men with tangible success which energized them 
because they had never achieved that under their previous leaders. 
The third component of a Charismatic leader is that of Enabling. This occurs when the 
leader is capable of demonstrating personal relations with the followers, and expresses 
confidence in their troops. 34 This might be the most di-fficuit component to achieve in that 
expressing confidence in ones troops often means allowing them to make their own decisions. 
General Lee was very accessible to his men. He cared for his men tremendously as 
demonstrated in his first actions in 1861 which were to ask the governor of Virginia about the 
32 Bruce Catton, 268. 
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arrangements that were being made to properly supply the troop. 35 Lee was concerned over the 
Jack of supplies being sent by the states to the troops because the Confederate states were 
withholding supplies to be used on their home guards, or militias rather than for the army. His 
early concerns was over the care of his troops, because if they were not taken care of': then 
victory could never be achieved. He also demonstrated his desire to encourage and enable his 
soldiers through his common dealings with them. A courier, Captain Blackford, wrote that "'He 
(Lee) always had some word tu say which cheered me, asked me questions as to where different 
brigades or batteries were moving, or something which, if not useful to him, made me feel of 
some consequence. "36 Lee would enable his soldiers by making them feel important, he was 
able to make each individual feel as if they were making important contributions to the war 
effort. 
One of General Lee's greatest strengths was his ability to show confidence in his 
fo11owers by trusting them to take the right actions. As his generals proved themselves, Lee 
would allow them to do more things independently. This did not always work out for good as 
demonstrated by his wi11ingness to allow General J.E.B. Stuart to ride freely at Gettysburg to do 
whatever damage he could backfired when General Stuart failed to provide the main 
Confederate force with information on the positions of the Northern troops. 37 This forced the 
Anny of Northern Virginia into a battle it was ill-prepared to fight. However, by enabling his 
3
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subordinates to make their own decisions, and by expressing confidence in their decisions, 
secured Lee his greatest victory. 
The Battle of Chancellorsville was the crowning achievement of Lee~s enabling of 
followers. General Lee was discussing strategy with General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. He 
proposed a flanking maneuver by which a large contingent of Confederates would move down 
the battle line and attack the exposed flank of the Union anny. "Since the moment Lee 
suggested it, the move had grown in Jackson's mind. He had no intention of merely rattling 
Hooker, of trying to distract the Federals ... He meant to destroy the Union army.":ut Jackson had 
thought the plan over and wanted to enlarge it. During the maneuver, Lee would be left with 
14,000 troops versus the 70,000 Union soldiers. His response to this was two words: "Go on."39 
Lee did not know exactly how Jackson's plan would work or if it would even be successful, yet 
he had confidence that if Jackson recommended it then it could be done. 
McClellan definitely lacked the enabling quality of a charismatic leader. Although he 
had good relations with the troops and cou1d inspire confidence in them. he simply cou1d not 
enable his followers to take the initiative. Shortly after being assigned command of the Army of 
the Potomac in 1861, he wrote his wife: "I must ride much eveiy day for my anny covers much 
space, and unfortunately I have no one on my staff to whom I can entrust the safety of affairs."°'' 
38 Ernest Furgmso~ Chancellorsyjlle 1863; The Souls of the Brave, (New York: Alfred 
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If McClellan could not trust his staff to look after the army when it was simply training in the 
outskirts of Washington D.C.~ how could be hope to enable others during battle? The answer is 
si.mple, he did not expect anyone else to step forward during battle. He had that little confidence 
in the capability of his men to Jead while having extreme confidence in his own leadership 
abilities, McClellan was angry that the president had intervened and appointed corps 
commanders because he had planned on assigning people to the position after they :had proven 
themselves in battle. This would mean that McClel1an himself would be directing over t 30,000 
men himself in the first major engagement 41 This never occurred due to the presidential 
intervention and the forcible institution of officers to lead segments ofMcCleUan·s anny. It 
does not seem as ifMcClellan had confidence in anyone but himself. 
General Grant seemed to relate more with Robert E. Lee in this component than he did 
with McCleUan. Grant encouraged and rewarded his troops for taking actions on their own. As 
they showed their ability, Grant's confidence would build and they would be given even more 
daunting cha11enges to pursue. General Phil Sheridan is a prime example of this. The feisty 
calvary commander showed his ability at the battle of Chattanooga. The union force was 
trapped in the city of Chattanooga with the Confederate forces entrenched in the mountains 
surrounding the city. His men were sent to stonn Missionary Ridge, but after taking the first line 
of rifle pits, he realized his orders were vague and sent for clarification. While waiting he chose 
to continue pushing forward and eventually took Missionary Ridge from the deeply entrenched 
Confedemtes. 42 This sparked confidence in Sheridan as Grant recognized his ability to lead men 
41 Stephen Sears, 161. 
42 Bruce Catton, 82-83. 
and think for himself. Later, at the Battle of the Wilderness, General Sheridan told his superiors 
that ifit were left to him he would take his calvary and "whip" J.E.B. Stuart. When Grant heard 
of this, his response was: "Did Sheridan say that? ... He usuaUy knows what he is talking about. 
Let him go ahead and do it. .. 43 Grant did not know what actions Sheridan would take, but he had 
the confidence in his subordinates that he was willing to allow him to take action without 
understanding what the plan was. 
Ill Powen and Influences 
There are a variety of Powers and Influences which can be used by a leader to enforce his 
will or to help motivate the fo11owers towards the goal or objective. These are: 
I) Reward Power-the ability to mediate the distribution of positive or negative reinforcers 
2) Coercive Power-the capacity to dispense pumshments to those who do not comp1y with 
requests or demands. 
3) Legitimate Power-Authority that derives from the power holder's legitimate right to require 
and demand compliance. 
4) Referent Power-Influence over others that is based on their identification with, attraction to, 
or respect for the power holder. 
5) Expert Power-Power that derives from others' assumption that the power holder possesses 
superior skills and abilities.44 
It is interesting to note that the generals all shared certain powers. As in any organization, the 
military, uses a variety of methods to motivate soldiers to work towards the goal This paper 
wi11 focus on reward, coercive, and legitimate powers because of their importance in a military 
environment. 
43 Ibid, 216 
44 Donelson Forsyth. Group Dynamics,, (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Company. 1983), 182. 
Each of the leaders being examined demonstrated the use of Reward power through 
their ability to reward their respective followers through a variety of means. A soldier could be 
rewarded in many different ways during the Civil War. The first was through commendation 
such as meda1s. awards. and special recognition during parades or military reviews. Another 
way in which the leaders could exert reward power is through promotions. The military is a 
hierarchical structure with ranks ranging from the 1owest common soldier to the general in 
command of all Union or Confederate forces. Soldiers were often rewarded for their efforts to 
perfonn their duty to the best of their ability in the hopes of attaining the goa1 shared by all in 
the military. A soldier could be promoted through a variety of levels for officers and common 
so1ruers. This upward mobility also provided means through which individuals could attain 
success and elevate themselves from low to high status in the military which could translate to a 
higher social status after the war. Another intriguing way in which troops were rewarded by 
their commanding officers was by placing units in a position of honor for battle. For example, 
shortly before the second battle of Manassas took place, Captain Greenlee Davidson company 
was transferred. Captain Davidson vvrote home that: 
... General Lee in anticipation of a fight has assigned my company temporarily to 
General [Winfield S.] Featherstone's Brigade. The Brigade is one of the best 
fighting commands in the army and is always sent in the advance. I consider it a 
compliment to be assigned to such a Brigade. 45 
Companies, Battalions, and even entire corps often considered their placement in the army or in 
a battle as a reward. Captain Davidson, and his company, believed that they were rewarde<l for 
their valor in previous engagements by being assigned to a brigade steeped in success and 
4
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prestige that was known for leading the charge. Casualties in those brigades were often high, but 
it was considered an honor to be trusted 10 be the first Union or Confederate unit to engage the 
enemy. 
Another type of power exerted by the generals of this study was that of coercive power. 
Coercive power has been defined as the ability to punish those wbo fai1 to comply with the 
instruction of leaders. Lee. McClellan, and Grant all exhibited coercive power as a means to 
keep the army in 1ine. The greatest sin that a soldier could commit next to treason was that of 
desertion in the face of the enemy. Reasons for desertion varied which led to the designation of 
troops as Absent Witbout Leave (AWOL). These were soldiers who were not present but not 
believed to have deserted. This most often occurred after battles when soldiers were separated 
from their comrades due to the confusion that set in on a batt1efie1d~ or when troops were faced 
with a family emergency and would rush home without getting proper authorization.. Tt occurred 
as men would go visit loved ones who lived near the anny encampment or whi1e they were out 
foraging for much needed supplies and food This was a problem that was rampant in both 
Union and Confederate armies. A Union soldier, John Billin~ wrote that "there was no time in 
the history of the Anny of the Potomac, after its organiution by McClella~ when it reporred 
less than one-fourth its full membership absent without leave. "46 Soldiers were most often 
reprimanded and their permanent military records would record that they were AWOL and list 
the dates that they were missing from active duty. 
46 Wdip Life m fie Union and Confederate Armiea, Ed. Philip Van Doren Stem. 
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Genera\ Lee had final authority over the executions since the so1diers had appealed their 
punishment. Jackson argued that the punishments should not be overturned because then 1he 
troops would see this as an opportunity for them to disobey military orders and law without fear 
of consequences. Genera] Lee agreed with Jackson on this case and approved the three death 
sentences. Thus, coercive power is seen as a means of punishing troops and demonstrating to 
the remaining soldiers that not fo11owing the orders of the leaders potentia11y could be met with 
punishment. Edward Moore, a cannoneer under Jackson viewed these executions "as a warning 
to others, the whole division was mustered out to witness the painfully solemn spectacle."so 
Making the entire division view the executions as a warning was in effect demonstrating that the 
leaders have the write to punish the troops. 
Although those guilty of being separated from their units for short periods of times were 
often not punished. those guilty of other offenses were often severely punished In the Federal 
anny. a soldier who was labeled a coward would be drummed out of camp. Billings Mites that 
"Whenever a man's courage gave out in the face of the enemy, at the earliest opportunity after 
the battle he was stripped of his equipmenl'S and uniform, marched through the camp with a 
guard on either side ... while a fife and drum corps brought up the rear.''' 1 In this situation, the 
leaders would attempt to instill courage in the troops by punishing cowards. The men were 
stripped of all military belongings and humiliated as they were marched out of camp in front of 
their feltow troops to the tune of the fife and drum. This demonstration of coercive power was 
~ Edward Moore. The Stoor of a Canru>neer Under Stonewall Jackson,. (New York: 
The Neale Publishing Company, 1907), 99. 
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effective in that it would make a soldier think twice before fleeing during a battle. Most Civil 
War companies were organized by states. counties) and cities before being attached to the anny. 
This meant that they were humiliated in front of neighbors, friends. and family. Word would 
certainly reach their homes about the incident and they wou1d be haun1ed by their actions for the 
rest of their lives. 
Legitimate power is another which is prevalent in the military during the Civil War. The 
foUowers had to believe that the leaders had the right to order them. The War Between the 
States can almost be viewed as a war over legitimacy. Generals Grant, and McClellan were able 
to exert legitimate power because their soldiers had taken an oath to their country. They 
believed that the United States was the lawful government, and it was fighting against the states 
which had illegaUy withdrawn from the Union. This belief in the validity of the United States 
transferred Legitimate power to the leaders of their armies, because the valid government had 
placed those officers in leadership positions. 
The same holds true for the Confederates. They were fighting for what they believed to 
be the legitimate governme~ and thus the legitimate Jeaders of the mili1aty. After the war~ 
Robert E. Lee was questioned by the Congress of the United States and was asked if the South 
had committed treason by seceding. Lee repJ;ed that "most Southerners believed secession llad 
been the responsibility of the states rather than ofindividuals ... The act of Virginia, in 
withdrawing herself from the United States, carried me along as a citizen of Virginia; her laws 
and her acts were binding on me.~"2 The Southerners who recognized the Confederate States of 
America would acknowledge that government as having legitimate power over them. 286 out 
'
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of 1,036 United States Anny officers resigned their commissions and joined the Confederate 
military when the Confederacy was first formed. sJ The recognition of legitimacy is seen in the 
actions of these officers . 
... With the flagrant exception of General Twiggs' treasonable surrender in Texas. 
these officers honored their oath of allegiance to the United States unti1 their 
actual departure from their posts. The great majority were most meticulous in 
turning over their commands and accounts in strict conformity to regutations54 ... 
The Southern officers granted legitimacy to the government of the United States with power 
over them as Jong as they actively seived in the army. The legitimate power that the United 
States had over these men was recognized by most and because of it they honored their 
commitment and oath to the government of the United States until their resignations were 
accepted and they could leave their post These troops honored the legitimacy of the United 
Sta1es by performing their duties and handing over their command without having undermined it 
or purposely caused any damages. These-soldiers even returned the equipment granted them by 
the governmen~ even though it would have been of great benefit to the Confederate miHtary. 
As the soldiers gained confidence in their leaders and began respecting what they were 
doing, then the leaders gained referent power. Expert power is something each of these generals 
had because it was assumed that they would each possess it, although whether or not General 
McC1ellan actuaHy held expert power is a question. 
IV. Fotlowenhip 
~
3 Dupuy, 28. 
54 Dupuy, 29. 
Richard Hughes, Robert Ginnett, and Gordon Curphy argue that ••People are motivated to 
meet five basic sorts of needs."·" The five stages form a hierarchy and has been referred to as 
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. The lowest stage is that of Physiological needs, then Security 
needs, BeJongmgness needs, Esteem needs, and finally Self-actualization needs. These five 
stages of need should be provided for if one wishes to successfully motivate followers 
The first stage of physio1ogical needs is simply the basic needs for survival, they include 
food, shelter, and water. General Lee and the Confederacy did the best they could to provide the 
soldiers with an of these items, although as the war ran on, they began to Jose the ability to take 
care of the troops, so rations began to shrink. The Rebels often went without having their basic 
needs met. but because oftbe success they achieved in battle, the men were wil1ing to survive on 
the bare necessities. However, when the end drew near for the Confederates, the inability to 
meet these needs began to effect the followers. They were no longer winning on the fie]d of 
battle, so the higher level needs, such as esteem, were not being met. This made it much more 
dffiicu1t for the fo11owers to survive off the minimum fulfillment ofphysio1ogical needs. The 
surrender of the Anny of Northern Virginia occurred after Federal calvary under General 
Sheridan captured several trainloads of rations meant for the Confederates. they had Htt1e choice 
but to capitulate because they could not even care for their most basic needs. 56 The two 
Confederate invasions of the North were done for a variety of reasons, one of which was to 
" Richard Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, "Understanding and Influencing Follower 
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for the future. Lee continued to serve, to lead, and he did it by attempting to heal the wounds of 
a divided nation. In honor of Lee for his service to the sta1e and to the coIJege, the school 
changed its name to Washington and Lee. After a failed presidential bid in 1864, McClellan 
retrred although he consistently tried to remain in the eye of the public. ln 1877. he was 
nominated for the governor of New Jersey, a post to which he was quickly elected. Although he 
never served in the capacity of President as the British ambassador had predicted back in 186 I., 
McClellan made the best of his situation and contributed greatly to the state of New Jersey.64 He 
successfully guided the state through difficult economic and political times before retiring to 
write his memoirs. General Grant would continue in the pubUc's eye as well as he accepted the 
nomination for President of the United States where he served two terms in office. Grant viewed 
things such as this as an opportunity to continue to serve his country and although his 
administration faced many controversies and scandals, he was always wiHing to serve his 
countty in whatever capacity possible. 
VI. Leader Development 
It is amazing how important leader development is in a conflict such as the ctvil war. 
The attrition rate for leaders at afl levels were quite high because they could dJe from disease or 
battle on any given day. The development of leaders in the Northern and Southern anntes is 
very interesting and goes a long way in explaining the armies and where they stood during the 
war. 
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At the outbreak of the Civil War, the South had numerous military leaders step forward 
because they had resigned their commissions in the United States Anny, or bad served as 
instructors at a variety of military academies. From the early stages of the war, Southern leaders 
were given more leeway and independence1o act Stonewall Jackson, and J.E.B. Stuart struck 
havoc at the Union forces with their freedom to move and make decisions based on their 
situations. This offered a stark contrast 10 the Union army who under McCle11an had no 
freedom ofleadership, nor were efforts made to develop young leaders because McClellan felt 
that only he could lead the army to victory. It is no wonder that leaders such as Gran1, Sherman, 
and Sheridan emerged from the Wesrem theater where Grant had altowed his commander some 
autonomy and as they proved themselves more and more. 
As the war progressed and Southern leaders died, fewer and fewer people stepped 
forward to fiH those positions. With the loss of Stonewall Jackson at 1he Battle of 
Chancellorsville, there was no development of new leaders to replace him, and those who filled 
his ro1e often failed The Army of Northern Virginia, under Lee, also did a good job of 
developing leaders. Lee quickly focused on the likes of Generals Stonewall Jackson, and J .E.B. 
Stuart who proved tbemse1ves on the battlefield and to the men. Jackson especia11y was a 
success in whom Lee could entrust the most daring of plans. Historians familiar with the faith 
Lee had in Jackson wrote that ''So Jong as Jackson was alive, 1here was never any doubt in Lee's 
mind to whom he should entrust the most daring venture. ••M The important distinction is that 
this held true while Jackson was alive. General Lee had grown so accustomed to his 
subordinates being effective fottowers that when Jackson died, he never developed anyone to 
6s Joseph Mitche11, 75. 
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n:plact: the missing leadership. Jackson died of wounds received at the Battle of 
ChanceUorsville when he was accidently shot by his own men while scouting ahead of the army. 
In the ensuing Northern invasion, General Lee suggested that General Ewell take the high 
ground He did not make it an order because he was used 10 hayjng someone like Jackson taking 
a suggestion and effectively canying it out with their personal expertise and additions to the 
plan. This was a crucial mistake in the battle, because once the Union gained control of the high 
ground,. there was little chance for victory by the Confederates. It was the loss of trained, 
effective leaders and the fai]ure to train replacements that began 1o cos1 the Confederates at 
major engagements. The South had started the war developing many leaders, but as the war 
progressed it became harder for them to develop and once that process broke down, they began 
to lose more battles which eventually cost them the war. Defeats at Gettysburg, Atlanta, and 
Petersburg can be attributed to the failure to develop new leaders. The Union progressed on an 
opposite course. They started out losing many batttes during the war because they did not do a 
good job of devdoping leaders. However, as the war progressed and they began to develop the 
likes of Sherman and Sheridan who could operate independently and still achieve the desire 
goals secured victory for the Northern force. 
While McClellan was in command of the Eastern Theater for the Union forces; he did 
not beJieve in enabling others. As demonstrated in the earlier quote, McClellan wanted to 
command all of the troops without delegating responsibility to any other leaders. This failure to 
develop new leaders hindered the war effort for the Union. McClellan was replaced as 
commander of the Army of the Potomac on two different occasions. His replacements fared 
1itt1e better against Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Anny of Northern Virginia. McCle1lan 
had failed to develop these individuals as leaders, and they learned from observing McClellan 
lead the anny. The resu1t of this was a mixture of ideas on what proper action shou1d be. 
General Burnside was overly aggressive. most likely from.observing McCle1lan's hesitancy. 
This 1ed to his leading the Anny of Potomac in an unwise assault on the entrenched Confederate 
troops at Fredericksburg. The resulting blood bath led to his replacement with General Hooker. 
·'Fighting Joe" Hooker was also more aggressive, yet he did not cover the details which 
McClellan did, thus leaving him susceptible to the flank attack by Stonewall Jackson. Finally, 
General Meade fought the Confederates to a standstill at Gettysburg. yet he had adopted the 
slowness of McClellan and did not pursue the weakened Confederates. 
This 1ed to the appointment of General Grant as commander of the Anny of P01omac. Grant 
spent the early years of the war fighting in the Western theater where McClellan had little 
control and even Jess interest This freedom from the influence ofMcCleUan a11owed Grant the 
freedom to develop and train his subordinates. A testament to the Grant's development of 
leaders in the West lies in those individual leaders· success as independent commanders. When 
Grant assumed command of the Anny of the Potomac, he brought many of his corps 
commanders ftom the West with him. He aJso chose to place key subordinates in positions 
where they cou\d demonstrate their own leadership abilities. He placed General William 
Tecumseh Sherman in command of an army and gave him free reign with tbe onJy orders being 
to advance towards Atlanta and cut the heart out of the Confederacy. His Calvary commander 
Phil Sheridan was given freedom to maneuver and engage the Confederate calvary as he saw fit. 
Grant had recognized the abi1ity of these men and entrusted them to make correct decisions in 
order to secure the future of the war. 
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The generals on both side would stand by the decisions of their fol lowers. General Lee 
trusted Jackson, or Stuart to make independent decisions and to lead the troops to the best of 
their ability. Grant. did the same. When General Sherman's treaty with General Johnston was 
not approved by the government, Grant was ordered to go dovm and take over. Secretary of War 
Stanton,, "ordered Grant to take over personal command of Sherman's armies. Grant, refusing to 
do this, soon calmed ruffled feelings." 66 Grant joined Sherman in North Carolina, but allowed 
Sherman to continue negotiating by himself. General Grant was available as a resource for 
Sbennan to use in coming to tenns with the surrender of the Confederate Army led by General 
Joseph Johnston. He trusted the decisions and efforts of his subordinates and did not interfere, 
Grant was just present to offer his opinion and expertise when Sbennan needed it. 
VIX. Conclusion 
Many individuals bave associated the success that the Confederacy had early in the war 
with the leadership of its generals. They also assume that the demise was due to the seemingly 
overwhelming advantage that the North had in regards to manpower, and manufacturing 
capabilities. Although the North did have a large advantage, it was their leadership that 
ultimately won the war for the Union. As the war dragged on, the South began to lose its 
leadership edge as the North found a general who was equally capable of1eading. 
[t seems that when examining the wide variety of types of leadership, traits, and powers 
that the primary military leader in the-South, Robert E. Lee, had a sizeable advantage to that of 
his adversary, George B. McClellan. McClel1an fai1ed to train new leaders, he did not search for 
66 Dupuy~ 417. 
effective followers. nor did he effectively fotlow his superiors. Rather, McClellan seems to have 
viewed himself as the onJy one truly capable of leading the Army of the Potomac to victory. 
McClellan's failure to successfully lead his troops to victory, and the same failure which his 
subordinates bad when they had the opportunity led to the introduction of General lTiysses S. 
Grant to the Eastern theater. 
It is interesting to see that in a hierarchy. such as the military, when the commanding 
officer fails to lead, then his subordina1es are not prepared 10 lead, and the troops cannot 
effectively follow. General Grant was operating in the Western theater oftbe War between the 
States and created his own system ofleadership. When Grant was promoted and transferred to 
command of the Army of the Potomac, the only thing which changed was the leaders at the top 
of the command structure. Y~ the men who comprised the Anny of the Po1omac d1d not 
change. These followers were not transplanted from the West. Rather, they for the first time 
had strong leadership which allowed them to become more effective followers and a11ow them 
to fulfill the goal of winning the war. 
The system of leader development that Robert E. Lee used was quite similar to the one 
Grant had in the West. Lee and Grant both allowed their subordinates to prove themselves in 
battle and slowly take more and more responsibi1 ity until their followers were effective leaders. 
With the death of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee failed to replace him because he found no one 
capable of stepping right into the same place Jackson held. General Lee treated the variety of 
generals who attempted to replace General Jackson as if they were of the same mold. He did not 
s1ow1y bring anyone along, he continued to order them the same way he would have ordered 
Jackson. At Gettysburg, Lee suggested that Ewell take action knowing that if it had been 
Jackson that order would have provided the freedom to take the initiative and win the battle. 
Yet, Ewen had not developed to that point yet and needed strict orders. The la."'< in leader 
development greatly hurt the South in the latter portion of the war. 
Once the Army of the Potomac obtained effective 1eaders, they were able to bring the full 
weigntofthe North against the Army of Northern Virginia. With sound leadership. Grant was 
able to make the manufacturing and manpower disadvantage devastating to the Southern cause. 
[t was the leadership of both sides which shaped the course of the War between the States, and 
ultimately decided the outcome. The Civil War provided an outlet for many leaders to develop. 
Many of the leaders of the war, continued to lead after the war in an effort to heal the wounds 
and make the Union whole. Leaders on both sides, Lee with his work in education, Grant and 
McClellan in their political lives all made a difference in the post war era. Just as their 
leadership made a difference to the men whom they were endeared to. Their names wil1 live on 
in the annals of American history as men who were willing to lead when the countty most 
needed ]eadership. 
